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To what extent do legislative elections turn on national issues, rather
than constituency service, candidate qualities, and the provision of pork?
This question has been a central concern in both the comparative and the
American politics literature, as it drives our understanding of the links between
citizens and their representatives. It also has important normative implications.
Writing for the American Political Science Association's Committee on
Political Parties (1950), Schattschneider emphasized the benefits of a system
in which the political parties take a leading role in debating and ultimately
defining national issues. Schattschneider contrasted "responsible" party
systems with that of the United States, where legislators are relatively
independent of their political parties and are protected from national swings
in the vote. As a result, national issues are of less consequence in legislative
elections than are the candidate's abilities to bring resources to the district,
solve minor constituent demands, and run a successful campaign. He argued
the implications for national welfare were decidedly negative.
The comparative literature has taken a similar stand, contrasting the
quality of political representation and the prospects for development in pork-
ridden systems such as Italy, Colombia, and Brazil with more nationally
centered party systems (Mainwaring, 1999; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987;
Geddes, 1991; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). This
work has helped to establish the conventional wisdom about the difference
between politics and elections in the United States and the United Kingdom,
as well as provoking a growing body of literature about the problems of political
accountability in the less industrialized regions of the world. It has also been
very influential in defining the incentives of legislators in pursuing a "personal
vote" (Carey and Shugart, 1995).
The substantive and methodological issues raised by Schattschneider
and his followers (see especially Stokes, 1965, 1967) are closely related to
two other sets of literature. First, Rose and Urwin (1970), Bartolini and Mair
(1990), Coppedge (1998), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Roberts and
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Wibbels (1999) have argued about the causes and effects of electoral
"volatility". An important purpose of Bartolini and Mair's work is to counter
the work about the growing instability in European elections, an issue with
direct consequences for accountability and representation in the short run
and democratic consolidation in the long run. While other factors can cause
electoral volatility, these authors explain that it has frequently been associated
with a decline of longstanding cleavage structures, which "encapsulate" and
constrain political conflicts. It is also related to questions about the national
consensus, the homogeneity of political culture, and the institutionalization
of democracy generally. Roberts and Wibbels focus on Latin America, arguing
that "electoral volatility is a function of short-term economic perturbations,
the institutional fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems,
and relatively fluid cleavage structures" (p. 575).
The second body of related work has focused on the "nationalization"
of elections, a term that applies to two different concepts. First, Stokes
(1967), Katz (1973), and Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (CFZ; 1983) have
used it to discuss the degree to which a party's electoral support responds
uniformly to national events or issues. This concept is thus related to
Schattschneider's concerns. More recently Caramani and Mainwaring/Jones
have used this term to apply to parties that have relatively homogeneous
electoral support across districts. Caramani argues that the degree to which
support is homogenous is related to the "territoriality of political cleavages"
(p. 67), and has important ramifications for the "standardization" of government
processes,  military  socialization,  social  welfare,  and  economic  policies
(p. 68). In a manner not dissimilar from Schattschneider and Stokes, he
argues further that as nationalization increases, "local candidates…lose their
character of representing the local community. Rather they become the
representatives of the national centre of the political organization" (p. 68).
This, he continues, leads the voters to shift their attention from local to national
issues. As a consequence of its effects on policy and the political process,
Mainwaring and Jones add that nationalization has implications for the survival
of democracy.
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In spite of clearly separable meanings of the terms "nationalization",
"district effects", and "volatility", a debate has continued as to the appropriate
definition, interpretation, and measurement of each concept. This paper, in
response, offers definitions of the concepts with more precise theoretical
and statistical meanings and develops a methodology to analyze the concepts
simultaneously. In so doing we are able to separate the concepts -which we
name district heterogeneity, the district-time effect, and electoral volatility-
and explain the theoretical and empirical relationships among them. Our
main conclusion is that there is no theoretical basis for conflating these
terms, and empirically the relations are very weak.
The statistical methodology that we draw upon is based on Stokes'
original model. In two landmark studies Stokes (1965, 1967) analyzed U.S.
and U.K. district level electoral results through a components of variance
model. Our version of that model -which we apply to 20 countries in Europe
and the Americas- allows us to parse the data and study district heterogeneity,
district-time effect, and electoral volatility as independent aspects of electoral
competition. We argue that without such parsing there is a danger of biased
results resulting from a conflation of issues. We draw on Stokes' model as it
allows us to distinguish and explore the interrelationship among these three
issues. We argue, however, that his and other similar models all have important
flaws, the interpretation of the effects is imprecise, and they require some
reorientation for application to comparative work.
In this paper we focus the majority of our attention on developing the
statistical model for studying the different components of elections. We do,
however, also reach several theoretical and empirical conclusions. Our primary
theoretical conclusion is that, despite their presumed ties in the literature,
there are neither statistical nor theoretical links between the district-time
effect and district heterogeneity, and neither is linked with volatility either.
The three concepts are, instead, three separable characteristics of parties.
But, because they all relate to electoral data, statistical studies that focus
on just one or two of the concepts run the danger of generating biased results.
At the empirical level, this paper focuses on the US-UK comparison, using
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the results from 18 other countries to test the theoretical proposition about
the relationships among the different components and put the results regarding
the United States and Great Britain into a wider perspective. This allows us
to argue that these two Anglo countries are more similar than different. We
show, in particular, although the conjunction of traits is not unique, the parties
in these two countries are among the very few that combine very
heterogeneous support across their nations, relatively stability over time,
and a significant role of local forces in their elections. At the same time, we
find that in recent decades the parties in the United States and Great Britain
have separated on the last of these traits (what Stokes called the "district
effect"), as the effect has grown considerably in Britain's former colony. This
is a noteworthy change given that Schattschneider and Stokes were very
concerned about the relatively small differences in the 1950s.
In order to put forth this argument, we first develop an example that
allows us to clearly define the effects that we are measuring. We then discuss
some of the problems with recent attempts to address these issues. Next,
we develop our components of variance model which we apply first to the
US-UK comparison and then to a broad set of cases across Europe and
Latin America. We use the empirical section to categorize 63 parties according
to the three traits and buttress our claim that the different aspects of
representation are not highly correlated. The concluding section summarizes
the findings and suggests directions for future research by noting a few of the
comparative patterns and discussing issues related to defining a model for
explaining these patterns.
DEFINITIONS AND PREVIOUS ANALYSES
The following example illustrates our definitions for district heterogeneity
the district-time effect and electoral volatility. The example assumes two
hypothetical countries, A and B each with three equally sized districts D1,
D2 and D3. For both countries party P1 is assumed to have won 59 percent
in D1, 53 percent in D2 and 47 percent in D3 for the first year, Y1. This
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represents relatively consistent support across districts, or a relatively low
district heterogeneity. In second electoral year, Y2, the overall average support
for party P1 dropped by 10 points in both countries, representing at least a
moderate level of volatility. The distribution of that loss, however, varied in the
two countries. Country A's party P1 lost exactly 10 percent in each district,
while in country B the 10 point total loss between the two years is not
distributed equally among the districts. The perfect consistency of the
electorate's movements across districts and over time would therefore yield
a district-time effect equal to zero in country A and considerably higher in
country B.
Volatility, in sum, is a measure of the degree to which a party's average
vote is stable across different electoral time periods. It should be high in
countries where successful new parties form or the electorate easily shifts
among parties.  We apply the term district heterogeneity to conjure an image
of the degree to which a party wins consistent support across districts.  It
should be relatively high for the U.S. parties, since their support varies greatly
between rural Kansas and metropolitan New York. Finally, the district-time
effect addresses the localism issue that concerned Schattschneider and
Stokes. Having once accounted for movement over time and across districts,
what is left are the idiosyncratic qualities and characteristics of candidates
and districts. Stokes interpreted this as a measure of the importance of the
idiosyncracies to the election, apart from national events. As we discuss in
more detail below, Katz and others have argued that these idiosyncracies
may also yield systematic (but not uniform) responses of the districts to
national events. Regardless of this interpretive distinction, the district-time
effect captures the degree to which variance in electoral returns is accounted
for by characteristics particular to districts (or candidates) at a particular
time.
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Though under different guises the concepts represented by district
heterogeneity, the district time effect, and electoral volatility have been at the
core of studies on electoral politics and representation, they have not been
clearly tied together either substantively or methodologically. Instead,
comparativists have generally addressed single dimensions of the problem.
For example, Caramani's historical study of Europe and Mainwaring and
Jones' interesting study of the "nationalization of parties and party systems"
in Latin America only address the homogeneity of support across districts1.
These are both important works that offer compelling findings and useful
methodological innovations. The above example, however, well illustrates
the problems with their unidimensional approach.
In the first of these studies, Caramani uses the coefficient (or index)
of variation2 to consider the spread of electoral returns to each party in
each district. If the returns are relatively consistent, then the party is
considered nationalized. He finds important variation across the countries
of Europe, but his main finding is increased homogenization of districts
over time. For both countries in Table 1, the standard deviation for party
P1 in both years is 6, and thus for both countries he would calculate a
coefficient of 6/53 in Y1 and 6/43 for Y2, numbers that would indicate
relatively high levels of nationalization. His measure, however, would miss
the perfectly parallel movement of the districts in country A and a lack of
such parallelism in country B.
It is important to note that Caramani calculated his statistics without
regard to whether a party competed in all districts. This may be defensible
since part of his interest was to show increasing levels of coverage for the
parties and in most of Europe the proportional representation systems
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encourage parties to compete in most districts. But, the model will not return
reasonable results for the United States, Great Britain, or other countries
where major parties fail to compete in all districts as a result of the use
single-member districts and incumbency advantages. In our analysis of the
single-member district countries, therefore, we exclude districts where either
of the two parties did not receive at least 2.5 percent of the vote in each
election years3.
Mainwaring and Jones have a similar goal in their tests for Latin America.
Instead of the coefficient of variation, they argue that the Gini coefficient
provides a better measure of inter-district homogeneity. Like the coefficient
of variation, the Gini coefficient yields a scaled statistic that is useful in
comparing results among countries or over time for a single country. They
then use this method to show which parties in which countries have had
more success in developing consistent support levels.
While they do provide interesting comparisons, the works by Caramani
and Mainwaring/Jones, in focusing solely on homogeneity of districts, have
important limitations. First, the measures are flawed, in that they effectively
conflate the issues of district heterogeneity and district-time, even though
seemingly they purport to assess only district heterogeneity. Second, while
it is useful to have a statistic that points to the different levels of Democratic
support in Massachusetts and Utah, it is also interesting to know whether a
scandal or its inverse in Washington produces consistent changes in the
Democratic votes in the two states. It is also important to capture the degree
to which the Democrats retain relatively consistent support across time. In
the terms of country A in the above example, the Caramani and Mainwaring/
Jones approaches would capture the important static differences between
districts D1, D2 and D3, but not the relatively volatile average support for the
party across time nor the remarkable dynamic consistency in the movements
across time for the P1 party. Along these same lines, offsetting district support
levels would go undetected in these homogeneity studies. That is with either
of the two approaches, if P1's vote totals for D1 and D2 were interchanged for
any year as shown in the comparison of the countries A and B, the statistics
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for homogeneity across districts would not detect the difference (i.e. they
would yield identical results in both examples)4.
A straightforward way to capture the dynamic element would be to
compare the swing -the change in the electoral returns for a party across two
elections- for each district. The standard deviation of the district-level swing
would give a sense of the degree to which districts move together.  If all
districts gained or lost a similar proportion of the vote across two elections,
then the standard deviation would be small. This would indicate that national
events have a similar impact across districts -or in the sense of the word
suggested by Stokes, that the election is "nationalized5". In the above
example, for country A party P1 had a swing of -10 points between year Y1
and Y2 in all districts and thus the standard deviation of the swing was zero.
Of course, a model looking solely at this indicator would suffer from the
same incompleteness as the studies on district homogeneity.
It is important to note that this notion of nationalization is not uniformly
accepted. As Katz and more recently Brady et. al. have argued, different
sets of the population should be expected to respond differently to issues.
New gun control legislation, for example, might harm the Democrats in the
South, but help them in the North. These authors, therefore, argue for
measures of non-uniform responses to national phenomena.
While this is a cogent argument, in a rejoinder to Katz, Stokes argues
that he tested for non-uniform responses and found them to be negligible.6
He argues further that uniform responses are an interesting phenomenon
that inform analyses of congressional behavior. Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale
concur, as the consistent responses indicate the degree to which "the
distinctive regional political cultures and traditions are being replaced by a
more similar mixture of political sentiments across the nation" (p. 80). Further,
they argue, while Katz's singular interest in distinguishing between national
and local stimuli leads him to "lump uniform and nonuiniform responses
together" (p. 83), Stokes' model -which we discuss in detail below- does
separate out the uniform effect. These authors also quibble with Stokes,
arguing that his measure of the "district effect" may contain elements of non-
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uniform responses to national events as well as the impact of candidates
and local effects. We concur with their interpretation and their general approach,
but we are concerned about important errors in the published formulas and
apparently faulty techniques in estimating the components of variance7.
Brady et al. (2000) are also interested in non-uniform responses, and
argue for a regression model of nationalization that includes as predictors
the vote for the president (which is supposedly national) and that for the
member of Congress in the district. Their measurement, however, still conflates
district heterogeneity with the district-time effect. Further, their measure may
still fail to capture the differential effect that some policies would have in
different districts. If the president became identified with a policy (such as
gun control) that drove support in different directions, then the coefficient on
the vote for the president in the previous election could be near zero, since
the regression (roughly) computes the average effect. Aside from these issues,
the Brady et al. model is not applicable to countries that, unlike the United
States, do not employ mid-term elections. As such, their model is incapable
of addressing comparative issues.
The last issue in these debates is the degree to which parties retain
consistent support across time. This has been an important issue in Latin
America, where some parties have risen and fallen in dramatic fashion. It
also generated much concern in Europe, where there was a perceived increase
in volatility since the 1970s that many associated with the breakdown of
traditional cleavage systems (as first defined by Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
While the debate about causes and consequences and even the
interpretation of data8 rages, the statistical techniques used to measure
volatility have not generated much controversy9. Most studies have settled
on the Pedersen index, which as Mainwaring and Scully explain, is calculated:
"by adding the net change in percentage of seats (or votes) gained or lost by
each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two. An index of 15,
for example, means that some parties experienced an aggregate gain of 15
percent of the seats  from  one  election  to  the  next  while  others  lost  a
total  of  15 percent" (p. 6).
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As with the studies of district homogeneity or inter-election swings,
volatility is a useful and interesting concept, but its unidimensionality calls
into question its statistical utility.
In response to all of these measurement and interpretive problems,
we propose returning to the method first proposed by Stokes. His approach
was to study district-level electoral returns through a components of variance
model that broke down the electoral changes into what he referred to as
district, state (or regional), and national components.  In contrast to the
recent studies, his basic approach can capture both the static and dynamic
aspects of electoral change. In particular, as we explain below in detail, our
modified version of his model captures, in terms of country A, the perfect
parallel of cross-time movement among districts, the important inter-district
heterogeneity, and the relative level of over-time consistency of party P1's
aggregate electoral returns.
While we favor the Stokes approach for its ability to account for the
multi-dimensional variance in electoral support, the specific model he uses
requires two important adjustments. First, we argue that his model has one
crucial flaw, regarding the assumption of fixed effects for the district and
state elements. Second, for comparative work, the model requires an
adjustment since unlike the United States, most countries have two
geographic levels as opposed to three10. As a result, while Stokes' model
allows for elections that vary at three levels -district, state, and national- our
comparative model only assumes two levels: district (which is equivalent to
a province or state in most countries) and what he called national11. We
argue further that the national component should be reinterpreted. As we
explain below, while that component does capture the uniform responses
that Stokes and others discussed when expressed as a percentage of the
total variance in the system, as a raw figure it signals the level of change in
a party's overall support. As such, it is an indicator of electoral volatility.
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THE STOKES COMPONENTS OF VARIANCE MODEL
In order to explain the problem with the fixed effect assumption and
describe our alternative model, we first transform the Stokes model from
three geographic levels to two. In addition to the national level, his model
provides for districts, subscripted by j, within states, subscripted by i. By
simply suppressing the j index and combining terms we are left with a model
that has only two geographic levels. The two-level analogue of his model
then becomes:
Model A*:
Here, yik is the percentage of the total vote (received by the political
party under consideration) in the election in district i at time k; K is the
number of elections, or years, covered by the analysis; I is the number of
districts; Ak is a nationwide random effect for time k, assumed to have mean
0 and (unknown) variance 4; βi  is a fixed effect (covering all years) for
district i, providing for district heterogeneity; Cik is a residual effect, or random
interaction effect, for district i and time k, assumed to have mean 0 and
variance 2σ ; and µ is a fixed effect representing the overall unweighted
mean of the party's vote percentages across all districts and elections. As in
the models that follow, Greek letters imply fixed effects and Latin letters
imply random effects12. The letter name of the model refers to which effects
are random. The asterisk refers to the inclusion, as opposed to absence, of
a fixed effect for the other component (e.g. A* implies a random effect for A
and the inclusion of a fixed effect for B).
The substantive interpretation, and hence the labeling, of these
components is critical. Stokes labeled the variance component attributed to
Ak (
2
Aσ ) the national component, arguing that it captures the average or
national movement of a party. This is an imprecise interpretation, however. In
the example above, the 2
Aσ would capture the 10 point aggregate change for
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the party, not the degree of uniformity of response in the districts (which is
captured in the residual). The interpretation given by Stokes is only justified
by considering 2
Aσ  as a percentage of total variance, since it would then
reflect the importance of the aggregate or national change in terms of other
factors. As a raw number, however, it indicates the magnitude of a party's
change in support, and is thus better interpreted as a measure of volatility.
Stokes' focus on the proportion of the total variance explained by 2
Aσ  is
explained by his focus on the United States and the United Kingdom.  The
raw numbers, however provide useful information for comparisons among
countries where volatility has been an important issue. For country B, the
model would (in rough terms) attribute the 10 point aggregate swing to 2
Aσ
and use the differences in each district from that average (-6, +6, and 0) to
estimate the residual component13. A focus on percentages alone would miss
the magnitude of that change. If, for example, there were a 20 point average
change with residuals also twice as large (i.e. if 
Aσ and σ both doubled)
the ratio of  to the total variance -and hence the figure for the "national
effect- would remain the same. The magnitude of 2Aσ , however, would be
much larger, correctly capturing the idea of greater volatility. As a result, we
label 2Aσ  our "time" or "volatility" component as its magnitude captures the
variance of the party over time (albeit at the national level).
As the βi in the model captures the variation in a party's average
returns across districts it is a measure of "district heterogeneity". We
generally agree with this interpretation, but we argue below for a variation in
how to model this concept.
Stokes reasoned that by accounting for the effects due to time
(national), state, and district he would be left with changes that could be
attributed to the qualities of candidates or the idiosyncratic characteristics
of districts. He thus interpreted the residual -Cik in our model- as a measure
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of the "district effect". This term is also somewhat imprecise, however, since
the residual has both a time and a district subscript. In other words, the
residual captures the idiosyncratic movement of districts and time that are
unaccounted for by district heterogeneity or national level volatility. Following
Stokes and CFZ, this should be interpreted, therefore, as capturing both
non-uniform responses to national policy, as well as the importance of
candidate characteristics and district peculiarities to the election. This leads
us to adopt the phrase "district-time effect".
The estimates of the variance components for model A* are
I
MM RA
A
−
=
2σˆ  and
MR=2σˆ .
MA , the mean square due to time, is calculated as:
 
1
2
−
=
K
S
M AA  where
∑
=
−=
K
k
kA yyIS
1
2
...
2 )(
 Following Stokes' notation, the dot subscript indicates the average
over the replaced index.  2
AS  is the sum of squares due to the time effect.
The mean square of the residual, MR or  
2σˆ , is defined by:
)1)(1(
ˆ
2
2
−−
==
IK
S
M RRσ
Finally, the residual sum of squares is:
2
....
11
2
)( yyyy kiik
K
k
I
i
RS +−−= ∑∑
==
Since βi   is a fixed effect, Model A* has just two variance components,
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2
Aσ  and 
2σ , but not one that pertains to variability among districts. This
seems to us an inappropriate assumption.
The decision to apply random or fixed effects is not always clear-cut.
According to Jackson and Brashers (1994), random factors should be applied
if the factors can be treated as if they were chosen at random from a
population, if the sample could be replaced by another sample without changing
the research question, or if the conclusions can be generalized to other
levels of the variable (p. 5-6). In this case, while our districts are exhaustive
for a particular year, they are simply the observed sample of all district years.
Further, we could hypothetically redraw the district boundaries and rerun our
analysis without changing our research questions.
Still another conception of this issue is to consider the districts (or the
times, for that matter) as being drawn randomly from a superpopulation
(Deming and Stephan, 1941). The superpopulation of districts would be the
hypothetical infinite set of districts from which the actual districts could have
been drawn.
Thus, it seems clear that district heterogeneity should be treated as
emanating from a random effect. The consequence of treating random (in
this case district heterogeneity) effects as fixed is that an important source
of variation is simply left out of the analysis. All the variation is thus attributed
to the time (national) and residual components. As a result, by making the
inappropriate assumption that the effects for district heterogeneity are fixed,
the utility of the results is dubious.
Stokes apparently reasoned that any effect involving time should be
treated as random, but that any effect involving only geography should be
treated as fixed on the grounds that the population of a district (or state) is
given. Our alternative formulation postulates random rather than fixed variation
with respect to district heterogeneity.
Our solution to this problem is to simply replace the βi with a Bi,
where Bi is a random effect (covering all years) for district i, assumed to have
The Components of Elections
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mean 0 and variance 2
Bσ . We therefore apply the model:
Model AB:  ikikik CBAy +++= µ
In this model Ak and Cik have the same expectations and variances as
in model A*, and also 2Aσ  and 
2σ are estimated the same as before. We
now require, however, expressions to estimate 2
Bσ , MB, and  
2
BS , respectively
the mean square and the sum of squares reflecting district heterogeneity,
are calculated as:
1
2
−
=
I
S
M BB  and
∑
=
−=
I
i
iB yyKS
1
2
...
2 )(
Under model AB, the statistic
K
MM RB
B
−
=
2σˆ
is used to estimate (and has the expected value of)  2
Bσ . Under Model
A*, however,
K
MM RB −
 does not estimate 
2
Bσ
because the model has no 2
Bσ .
Instead, this statistic has expectation  
)1(
.)( 2
−
−∑ I
i
i
ββ
, where β. is the
mean of the I βi's.
Though Model AB is our preferred model, it is important to discuss
another variant, proposed by Kawato (1987). Kawato uses a different form of
a components of variance model to reexamine Stokes' findings about the
increasing role of national forces in U.S. elections. His model, however, makes
what we consider to be some untenable assumptions that result in the
18
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exclusion of certain sources of variation. He assumes a nested model of
districts within states and states within the nation14. To explain, we first
modify Kawato's model as we did with the Stokes model to account for just
two geographic levels (district and nation) instead of three (district, state,
and nation). The two-level analogue of Kawato's model is
Model A:     .ikkik CAy ++= µ
Because Model A is a nested model of districts within the nation, it
has the same type of flaw as the corresponding three-level model. It is,
however, a simpler model and therefore easier to present. Because of its
nested nature, Model A has neither a random effect (Bi in Model AB) nor a
fixed effect (βi in Model A*) to take account of district heterogeneity. In fact,
it rests on the dubious assumption that variability among districts is
nonexistent, that is, that  2
Bσ  = 0 in the context of Model AB or that all βi's
are the same in the context of Model A*. As a consequence, if variability
among districts does exist, then the Model A estimates of both 2σ and 2Aσ
(whose formulas are given in Table 2) will be distorted, with the former estimate
being inflated and the latter too low15.
Model AB treats time and districts symmetrically, whereas Models A*
and A do not. That is, Models A* and A retain a random effect for time but not
for district heterogeneity. Why, one might wonder, would it not be equally
logical to apply a model that has a random effect for district heterogeneity
but not for time?  This query leads to the last two models that we cover,
Model B*:   ikikik CBy +++= αµ     and
Model B:        .ikiik CBy ++= µ
Model B* is the same as Model AB except that Ak, a random effect for
time k in Model AB, has been replaced by αk, a fixed effect for time k.
Model B is like Models AB and B* except that it has neither a random nor a
fixed effect for time.
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Of course, we mention Models B* and B not because we advocate
them, but rather to give a fuller perspective. Although models like A* and A
have appeared in the literature whereas models like B* and B apparently
have not, there would seem to be little more reason to treat the effects for
time but not district heterogeneity as random than to treat the effects for
district heterogeneity but not time as random. We prefer both to conceive of
districts as being drawn randomly from a superpopulation of districts and to
conceive of times as being drawn randomly from a superpopulation of times.
The Table 2 indicates the primary elements of the different models.
The models are differentiated as to which effects are included and whether
these effects are dealt with as fixed or random effects.
There are methods to estimate variance components other than through
the traditional formulas that we have used16. These traditional formulas are
simple, are consistent with the work of Stokes (1965) and Kawato (1987),
and in most cases would appear to give results that differ little if any from
those of other, newer methods. Although some other methods do avoid negative
20
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estimates of variance components, such negative estimates did not arise
often in the data analyzed for the present paper.
APPLYING THE MODEL
Results for the Hypothetical Countries
In order to show the validity of the different approaches, we first return
to the simple three-district example we used earlier. Under our model the
estimates for the time, district heterogeneity, and residual (district-time) effects
for country A are, respectively:
2ˆ Aσ = 50.0,  
2ˆ Bσ =36.0, and   
2σˆ = 0.0.17
Consistent with the data,  2ˆ Aσ  implies that there is an important degree
of volatility in the party's support over time (the party having lost 10 percent of
its support), 2ˆ Bσ  implies that the party's base support levels among the districts
are somewhat variable (with a 12 percent difference in support separating the
two most extreme districts), and  
2σˆ implies that the party's vote across the
districts moves in perfect tandem (each district having lost exactly 10 points).
The estimate for district heterogeneity is about average in comparison with
most of the actual cases we detail below, while most actual parties sport
lower values for their time components. Of course, no actual party scored a
perfect zero for the district-time component, but the analysis did yield very
low scores for some parties in both Latin America and Europe. The parties of
the United States and Great Britain, in contrast, scored much higher.
As we noted earlier, Kawato's model generates biased results. His
model ignores 2ˆ Bσ and for both countries A and B it would calculate
2ˆ Aσ = 38
and  2σˆ = 36. The associated bias yields very misleading results (as he
underestimates 2ˆ Aσ  and overestimates 
2σ for both countries). Another problem
with the Kawato model (as with the Caramani and Mainwaring/Jones models)
is that it yields identical results for countries A and B. In contrast, our preferred
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model (AB) accurately reveals important differences between the hypothetical
countries. For country B our model would yield 2ˆ Aσ = 44.0,
2ˆ Bσ =18.0, and
2σˆ = 18.0.
The measures proposed by Caramani and Mainwaring/Jones for district
heterogeneity also yield misleading results. The problem with these measures
is that they reflect the district heterogeneity component and the residual
component combined. Note that for both countries A and B the sum of 2ˆ Bσ and
2σˆ  is 36, the square root of which is the standard deviation of the party's
vote percentages across districts in each year (equal to 6, as noted earlier)
that Caramani would obtain through his analysis.
For both countries A and B, Stokes' model would yield the same values
as ours for 2ˆ Aσ and 
2σˆ but would not produce a 
2ˆ Bσ at all.
Results for Actual Cases
To review, our model produces three components of variance. In non-
technical terms, the district heterogeneity component measures the degree
to which the vote share for a party is consistent across the country. Bigger
values of that component therefore mean that the party's vote shares are
less consistent across districts. The time component is analogous to studies
of volatility, in that it measures the degree to which a party's national vote
share varies across time. Larger values of this component, therefore, imply
that a party's national vote share is less consistent over time. The residual
component, finally, measures the degree to which the returns to a party vary
across elections within a particular district, having accounted for the other
effects. Here larger values imply more inconsistency in how a national level
shock is distributed across districts.
To begin to understand and compare these three concepts cross-
nationally, we first focus on the United States-Britain comparison. As noted,
for the United States, we followed conventional practice and only used districts
where both of the main parties won at least 2.5 percent support in every
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election over the time period18. In effect, however, a cutoff point of up to 20
points yields substantially the same set of districts. For that country, we
show results for the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s, accounting for redistricting.
Since there are just two parties competing, the results are the same for
each. For Britain, redistricting led us to assemble three periods for the
analysis: the five elections from 1955-1970, the three elections between 1974-
1979, and the two elections of 1983-1987. Following Stokes' practice, we
conducted the analysis on districts where either the same two parties or all
three parties competed in every year of the period. In the latter two periods
we were able to run the analysis on the Conservatives, Labour, and the
Liberals. For the first period, while the Liberals ran in enough districts for us
to calculate separate results for Labour and the Conservatives, the party did
not run in enough districts for us to estimate separate results for it. Further
details are in Appendix I.
In the multi-country below we present tables on both the raw estimates
as well as the proportions of the variance explained by each component.
Here, however, we focus on the raw values in order to draw attention to the
amount of variance inherent in the system.  The table below portrays the
estimates for the three components of variance for the United States and the
United Kingdom, showing important similarities for two components, but
important differences for the district-time component, especially in the 1970s
and 1980s.
The statistics under the time component heading reflect the parties'
changing support levels in the three sets of elections. For Britain, the
Conservatives saw important changes in their support levels between 1955
and 1979 (for example, falling about seven percent from 1959 to 1966), but
between the 1983 and 1987 elections their aggregate totals were virtually
unchanged. The statistics also reveal that a switch between the Conservatives
and the Liberals accounted for most changes in the 1970s, as Labour's
support remained quite stable. For the United States, there was greater
volatility in the 1950s than in the later decades, with tremendous stability in
the parties' vote totals for the 1980s. This stability is reflected in the remarkably
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small change in the congressional division of seats resulting from those four
elections.
Next and more dramatically, the table shows that the district
heterogeneity component dominates the other components for both countries,
and is similar in both absolute and relative terms for the two countries.
Moreover, in comparison to the other countries that we explore below, the
British and American figures stand out as among the largest. In both countries
this heterogeneity -which the statistics underestimate due to the exclusion
of uncontested districts- has manifested itself in the large number of safe
seats for one or the other of the main parties.
To show the validity of these data, Table 4 displays statistics that
correspond with Caramani's analysis of the spread of the party vote across
districts. While he does not dwell on the issue, his analysis of 1918 to the
present shows that the British electorate is the least homogeneous of any
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European country (see his Table 3.3, p. 75)19. Eliminating any district in
which the pattern of competition changed (e.g. the status of the Liberals
changed with respect to whether or not they competed) or where either the
Conservatives or Labour did not win at least 2.5 percent of the vote, the
standard deviation of the Conservative vote has varied between 10 and 15
points, and has been even higher for the Labour Party. The coefficient of
variation that Caramani studied has also been consistently higher since the
election in 1983 than in the previous quarter century. For Labour the coefficient
of variation is markedly higher than for either the British Conservatives or the
U.S. Democrats. In sum, as our components of variance model suggests
and this table confirms, parties in both countries experience wide differences
in their support levels across districts, even when accounting for uncontested
races and the occasional inclusion of third parties.
While the estimates for district heterogeneity are relatively similar for
the two countries, the estimates for district-time show important differences.
The figures in the last column of Table 3, as well as the columns indicating
the standard deviation of the swing in Table 4, resonate with standard
descriptions of the two systems, in that they imply that the electoral tides
are spread much more evenly across British districts than in the United
States.
Comparing the results for the district heterogeneity and the district-
time effects highlights the problem with the term "nationalization". These
statistics imply that while Stokes and Schattschneider were right about how
national issues or events are translated more consistently across Britain
than in the United States, in neither country are elections "nationalized" by
the standards applied by Caramani20.
Aside from the terminological issues, the two tables also suggest a
modified view of the comparison between the United States and the United
Kingdom. Stokes concluded that although the district-time effect (to use our
term) for the United States had shrunk considerably throughout the first half
of the 1900s, it was still much greater than in the United Kingdom. This
helped substantiate Schattschneider's fears about U.S. elections having
The Components of Elections
25
26
Scott Morgenstern; Richard F. Potthoff
greater focus on narrow constituency issues rather than issues of national
importance. Our figures for the rough time period (the 1950s) that Stokes
studied suggest that the district-time component was of a similar scale for
the two countries at that time, but that the difference grew dramatically in the
succeeding decades21.
The similarity of this effect for the two countries in the 1950s and
1960s becomes even clearer if we modify an important assumption that Stokes
made about which districts to include in his analysis. Stokes' study focuses
on only about one-half of British districts, including just those where the
Liberal party either competed every year or did not compete in any year. This
may be a reasonable assumption in that the inclusion of a third party can
have dramatic effects on the existing two parties. At the same time, however,
the fact that the Liberal party comes and goes at different times in different
districts implies that there is a larger district-time component than is implied
in the smaller dataset. Our figures in Table 3 use Stokes' assumptions about
the third parties, but if we reapply our model to the British data without taking
out the districts where the Liberals ran sometimes but not always, the district-
time component jumps for the 1955-70 period by about 50 percent for the
Conservatives and 20 percent for Labour. These new numbers almost rival
the statistics obtained for the United States in the 1950s.
Regardless of which districts we include in the analysis, the most
important result is that the trend that Stokes discovered towards a smaller
district-time effect in the United States has apparently been reversed (at
least in absolute terms). Schattschneider's concerns about high district-
time effects, then, appear to have more relevance today than for the period
that he and Stokes studied.
In sum, the estimates from the components of variance model and the
supporting descriptive statistics suggest several important theoretical and
empirical conclusions. First, at least for Britain, the two meanings of
"nationalization" found in the literature conflict. There, the relation between
the district heterogeneity and the district-time effect is negative, since while
there is great variability in the amount of support that different British
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constituencies provide for parties, there is relative consistency -at least vis-
à-vis the United States- in how the constituencies absorb national changes
in the parties' fortunes. Second, in contrast to the downward trend that Stokes
discovered in the United States for the first half of the 1900s, there was a
sharp increase in that effect for the 1970s and 1980s. This change, which
perhaps parallels the growing incumbency advantage, should be a cause of
concern to proponents of the responsible party model.
Finally, in spite of some divergence in recent decades, there are
important similarities in the results for the two countries. District heterogeneity
is relatively similar in the two countries and though local/ephemeral issues
may be more prominent in U.S. elections, they also enter into the British
equation. In other words, elections have not been "all local" in the United
States nor "all national" in Britain. In the next section we highlight this finding
by showing that few other countries have such high levels of district-
heterogeneity and district-time effects in a context of limited volatility.
COMPARATIVE EXTENSIONS
In order to put the United States-United Kingdom analysis into a
comparative perspective, and allow us to explore the relationships between
the three different indicators of representation, the following two tables display
the estimates for the variance components for a variety of European and
Latin American cases. We have conducted our tests on every European and
Latin American country for which data was available and party competition
was consistent enough to allow cross-temporal and cross-district tests. Data
for Europe comes from Caramani's publicly available dataset and we have
collected the Canadian and Latin American data from various sources22. We
constructed data sets for each of the countries that covered as many
consecutive post-war elections as possible, using only those countries and
parties where we could include at least three consecutive elections. The
only exception to this rule was the inclusion of Canada, for which there have
only been two consecutive elections with unchanged district borders since
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the 1970s. We included this case since, like the United States and the
United Kingdom, it uses single-member districts. Only in Canada, the United
States and the United Kingdom did we have to eliminate districts where
parties received only a minimal share of the vote, since by virtue of their
proportional representation electoral systems, the parties in our analysis
from other countries compete in every district23. In a few cases their vote
totals dipped below the cutoffs that we used in the British and American
cases, but the low returns appear as normal variation in their support. Details
about the cases are in the appendix.
Given that the analysis is only run for parties or alliances that were
large enough to have competed in (virtually) every district for at least three
elections, the results, in one sense, are biased towards the parties that are
relatively homogeneous in their support across districts, and not so volatile
as to have lost all their support24. But, the rise or fall of parties not included in
the analysis will be reflected in the statistics for the other parties. What our
numbers will reflect is how the changing availability of votes that results from
the birth or death of a party is captured by the other parties. If the change in
available votes were to have relatively even effects across districts, then the
change would be reflected in a smaller volatility component. If the change
were less homogeneous, the district-heterogeneity and residual components
would rise.
The first of the two tables below portrays the raw data from the
components of variance analysis, in order to give a sense of the magnitude
of the each component. The second table then converts the numbers into
proportions and arranges the cases according to the size of the party in
order  to  facilitate  comparisons  among  parties  of  relatively  equal  size
(Table 5).
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Taken together, these two tables suggest many interesting
comparisons among regions, within countries, and both among and within
party families. Developing these comparisons and a model to explain the
patterns is beyond the scope of this paper, because it would require careful
consideration of the different time periods and number of elections under
consideration -which are variant here due to our attempt to provide results for
the longest possible time period taking in which district lines did not change
and the same parties continued to compete. Still, for each individual case
the tables do provide information about how the change in electoral patterns
was distributed according to the three effects. In Canada, for example, the
extremely high time component is a function of the shocking collapse of the
Conservatives and the NDP in 1993, along with the rise of the Reform Party.
What may be less well-known is how the change was absorbed across the
country, which the district heterogeneity and district-time components capture.
Developing these comparisons and a model to explain the patterns, however,
is beyond the scope of this paper. Our main task, instead, is to use these
comparative results to reinforce our proposition about the similarities between
the United States and the United Kingdom and test the proposition about the
very weak link among the three variance components.
In this context, the first finding from the comparative data is that while
Table 3 suggested a widening gap between the United States and the United
Kingdom in recent decades, it is clear that these two countries are more
similar than different. The British and American parties are at the top of the
spectrum in terms of their district heterogeneity and close to the top for the
residual (district-time) effect. The parties from these two countries are joined
by only a handful of other parties as scoring high for both the district
heterogeneity and the district-time components: Spain's Popular Alliance,
Portugal's Alliance, and two parties from each of three Latin American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia). Of these, the two European cases are
parties (alliances) in flux, having much higher time components than the
other cases. The parties in the United States and the United Kingdom, along
with the few Latin American cases, could thus be described as having stable
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but heterogeneous support, plus an important district-time effect. This could
be contrasted with much of Europe, where parties have more homogenous
but less stable support, combined with minimal local/ephemeral effects.
Table 6 also reinforces the similarity of these two countries in terms of
what Stokes labeled the national effect. As discussed above, he uses
2
Aσ expressed as a percentage of total variance as his indicator of this effect.
Table 6 shows that in both United States and the United Kingdom are well
below the mean on this dimension.
These two typologies are not opposing ends of a unidimensional
continuum, because the three effects do not co-vary. If we eliminate the
parties that have less than 5 percent support, the Pearson correlation
coefficient between the time and district heterogeneity components is -0.09
and between the time component and our residual component it is only
0.3125. The relationship between the residual and district heterogeneity
components is also, 0.31. If we apply the tests to the ranks instead of the
actual values (i.e. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient) the strength of the
relationship between the district heterogeneity and residual components rises
considerably (to 0.57), but the relationship is still far too weak to conjoin
these components into a single dimensional continuum26. Moreover, if we
restrict the analysis to parties that have at least 10 percent, the Spearman
coefficient drops sharply (to 0.38).
The similarities of the United States and the United Kingdom, as well
as the weak relationships among the variables, is shown in the Table 7.
Dividing each of the components at its median, the table shows that all eight
possible combinations of the three components are filled and that while their
position is not unique, the United States and all the parties in the United
Kingdom do occupy the same cell.
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This weak empirical relationship stands in contrast to the presumed
strong relationship implicit in studies of single aspects of volatility, district
heterogeneity, and the district-time effects. There is very little basis for a
strong theoretical relationship either.
Consider, for example, the relationship between district heterogeneity
and district-time. If district heterogeneity is minimal, then one would not be
surprised to find that the district-time effect is also minimal, since the districts
generally must move together to yield the district homogeneity27. The reverse,
however, is not true. A party with heterogeneous support across districts
may experience a small district-time effect (as in classical analyses of Britain)
or a large district-time effect (as in the United States). It is therefore of little
surprise that the statistical relationship between these two variables is very
weak.
This pattern is evident in the data. Of the 63 cases in our sample
(ignoring the parties with less than an average of five percent support), five of
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the six with the lowest levels of district heterogeneity are also among the ten
cases with the lowest residual components. In contrast, of the six cases
that are found at the other end of the heterogeneity scale, only three rank
among the ten with the highest residual components.
The theoretical relationship between either of these variables and time
is even weaker. When district-heterogeneity is low, then perturbations in a
party's support would be magnified across the country, thus augmenting
volatility. But, it seems unlikely that a party that was entrenched enough to
have gained relatively homogeneous support across a country would also
suffer from significant volatility. Alternatively, we would expect rising new
parties or those led by crashing populists to have uneven support across the
country. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, show that
even over a long period of time, heterogeneous support levels do not
necessarily imply large levels of volatility.
Our data empirically confirm these expectations about weak links
between volatility and district-heterogeneity. Of the six most homogenous
parties, two experienced high levels of volatility (the Netherlands' Democracy
66 and Denmark's Conservatives). At the same time, other parties (notably
Italy's Socialists and MSI) were both very stable over time and could count
on very homogeneous support across districts. Towards the other end of the
scale we find the U.S. parties and the British Conservatives of 1983-1987,
which combined stability over time with heterogeneous support across
districts.
There is little theoretical basis to expect a strong relation between
volatility and the district-time effects either. While elections focused on local
issues could help a party stave off large fluctuations in its national vote share
(e.g. the United States), a high district-time effect would not necessarily
preclude sharp aggregate changes (unequally distributed amongst districts).
High volatility could also imply the coming and going of parties with strength
in only subsets of a country's districts (such as the Liberals in Britain in the
1950s and 1960s). The relationship is also ambiguous at the other end of the
scale. Where the district-time effect is very small, we should find some of
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the more volatile parties, since they could both take advantage of and be
vulnerable to changes in salient issues. A populist or Green party, for example,
could experience a meteoric rise or crash, since voters would be focused on
the national leaders and their issues. But, as argued above, where there is
low district heterogeneity there should also be a low district-time effect (though
the reverse is not true). The low district heterogeneity, we further argued,
was likely to be associated with established parties, which, in turn, impede
volatility. To further illustrate this weak relationship, imagine two countries
each with two districts. Assume further the ruling party has very different
levels of support in the two districts in one country, but its counterpart has
consistent levels support in the other country.  If both ruling parties crashed
to zero support, then the volatility would be high in both cases, but the
district-time effect would be high in the first country and low in the other.
Again, the data bear out this expectation. While five of the ten most
stable cases of parties over time rank among the seven with the highest
residual effect, Italy's Socialists and MSI have very low ranks for both of
these components. At the other extreme is Venezuela's AD, for example,
which was both the second most volatile party in the sample, as well as the
case with the sixth highest district-time component.
CONCLUSION
Though traveling under different pseudonyms, the concepts of district
heterogeneity, volatility, and the district-time effect have long been at the
center of debates about democratic stability and representation. In this paper
we have argued that analyses of these concepts have been hampered by
imprecise definitions, measurement techniques that are not broadly applicable,
and important flaws in the statistical models.
In our effort to explore these issues we have rejected recently developed
methodological tools, and have instead reverted to Stokes' original components
of variance model. In so doing we discovered an important flaw in his
methodology, and have thus offered here a modified version of his model. In
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addition to correcting a flawed statistical assumption, our alternative allows
straightforward analysis for countries that unlike the United States, use
proportional representation electoral systems. The method is also valid for
single-member district systems as found in Britain and its former colonies,
because for these countries it focuses on districts instead of states or
provinces as the proper level of analysis. Finally, while explaining the algebra
behind the model involves multiple lines of equations filled with Greek letters,
the model has the virtue of requiring only a few lines of code and a built-in
SAS function.
In applying the model we have focused on our finding that, although
they have separated on one dimension (the district-time effect) in recent
decades, the United States and the United Kingdom have some important
similarities that bi-country analyses have overlooked.
As this paper has focused more on methodological themes than on
comparisons and explanation, we have not attempted to develop a model to
explain the many suggestive patterns revealed in the empirical data.  That
data, for example, suggests that in spite of Caramani's finding that
nationalization has progressed throughout Europe, most parties' support levels
are still quite variable across districts. The data also shows that aside from
a few exceptions, the time components in both Europe and the Americas are
quite small. While the data set does not include some of the more volatile
countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, this is still a particularly
noteworthy finding for Latin America where historically parties have experienced
high levels of volatility. Another avenue for future research could explore the
dramatic differences between Europe and the Americas in terms of the inter-
election changes at the district level (as captured by the residual component).
With the exception of the Portuguese Alliance of the CDS and PSD, no party
in Europe scored above 12.7 for this component. For Latin America only the
Uruguayan parties, the Colombian Conservatives, and the Brazilian PT scored
below 29.4.
In moving towards an explanation of these and other patterns, future
researchers will have to contend with variation among regions, as well as
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among and within countries. Some apparent variables, such as the use of
single member district electoral systems, therefore, can only provide partial
explanations. The use of single member districts may help separate the
U.K. and U.S. cases from the pack, but that variable cannot explain the
widening gap in those two cases or the differences among other cases. It is
also clear that the size of the party or the number of districts in a system
cannot account for the size of any particular component uncovered in this
analysis, or even the amount of total variance. For example, joining the parties
of the United States and its former colonist in portraying a high level of total
variance are parties from Portugal, Venezuela, and Brazil, which have just
20, 23, and 27 districts respectively. At the other end of the scale, some of
the parties in Chile, Italy, and Spain  have relatively low amounts of total
variance in spite of having to compete across a relatively large number of
districts (60, 95, and 52, respectively).
Use of our methodology, in sum, provides a useful window on three
types of variability exposed in district level electoral data. While we leave the
difficult task of explaining the revealed patterns to future efforts, we would
suggest that any full explanation will require a combination of macro or
institutional variables to capture the inter-country and inter-regional differences
and a set of variables that can differentiate amongst parties within a single
country.
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Appendix
The countries selected to test for this model were all those available in
Caramani's dataset (available on CD) and those Latin American cases for
which we could acquire data. The U.S. data is available from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). We ran
the analysis for the most recent time period in which there were at least
three consecutive elections in which the main parties did not change and
there were no districting changes. As explained in the text, we also required
that the parties compete in all districts in all years. As a result, in cases
such as France or Germany, where two or more parties joined in at least
occasional alliances, we were forced to run the model as if the parties were
always in alliance. Similarly, for Chile we could only run the analysis on the
two coalitions instead of the parties, since no party has competed in every
district. As stated in the text, for the United States and Great Britain, we
followed conventional practice and eliminated districts in which the two main
parties did not each win between 2.5 and 97.5 percent (if the criterion were
changed to between 20 and 80 percent very few additional districts would
drop out). This is a less important restriction where there are multiple parties
running under proportional representation rules, and thus, for example, we
have calculated estimates for the Italian MSI, for example, in spite of their
support falling to under 2.5 percent (but not to zero) in some districts.
It is important to note the very serious errors that we found in Caramani's
dataset. For Britain we found about 20 errors (for the period 1955-1987) in
which a digit was dropped or added to the reported statistic, numbers were
erroneously transcribed, or the Labour and Liberal votes were interchanged.
The errors that we discovered all changed the affected party's vote by at
least 15 percent, and usually by at least 20 percent. We also found two
districts in Spain where there was a serious error in the statistic listed for the
Alianza Popular in 1982. We have verified that there are no significant errors
in other countries by looking at the inter-election changes at the district
level. A list of the errors we found is available upon request.
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The following table details the specific coding arrangements we followed,
the years of the included elections, and the number of included and excluded
districts.
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NOTES
1. Their statistics, however, effectively conflate district heterogeneity and the
district-time effect.
2. Coefficient of variation = Standard deviation/mean.
3. This is Kawato's cutoff point. Excepting 0, the choice of cutoff points has
almost no bearing on the analysis. As noted later, we also excluded one
Italian district where not all major parties competed.
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4. A final problem with either approach is that for two-party systems, the results
are dependent on which party the investigator chooses as a reference. For
example, the index of variation would be different for the Democrats and
Republicans in the United States, even though one is a reflection of the
other.
5. There is an important distinction between the "national effect" and a
nationalized election. For Stokes and Schattschneider the term nationalization
appears to mean that the national events drive elections. As such, Stokes
terms an election nationalized if the district effect (what we call the district-
time effect) is small. What he terms "national effect," however, is closer to
our measure of "district heterogeneity". The confusion is even greater if we
bring in Caramani and Mainwaring/Jones, whose use of the term
nationalization reflects the idea of district heterogeneity.
6. He then turns to a criticism of Katz's methodology.
7. See footnote 14 for details.
8. Bartolini and Mair, for example, largely debunk the notion that Europe
experienced an increase of volatility in the 1970s.
9. Bartolini and Mair even note: "there has been remarkably little debate or
disagreement concerning the actual mathematical formula from which the
index of aggregate volatility is derived" (p. 20).
10. A related difference between our model and that of Stokes involves his use of
nesting. In his model he nests congressional districts within states, in order
to account for systematic movements of all districts within a state. CFZ,
alternatively, nest the districts (actually counties in their case) within regions.
Neither of these techniques can be applied comparatively, for, among other
reasons, the fact that under most PR systems there is but a single district
per state (or province). We see the justification for nesting a sub-sub-national
level within a sub-national level as rather underdeveloped and imprecise.
While Stokes' method assumes the possibility of state tides, CFZ argue in
favor of a model that measures regional tides. An alternative approach could
test for tides among districts based on rural-urban categories, their relative
wealth, ethnic makeup, or some other characteristic(s) of districts. All the
points just mentioned lead us to use a basic model without nesting -a
model with the district as a single sub-national level, and with the district
effects random rather than fixed as will be explained shortly.
11. An alternative to dropping the extra geographic level would be to assign a
regional component to the European and Latin American countries that would
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be analogous to the U.S. states. This is the strategy that Stokes follows in
his later (1967) article for application to the United Kingdom. We refrained
from following this method, however, for although there are some exceptions
where regions elect governors or other regional figures, in most of our cases
the regions and the districts are co-equal.
12. In this and all other models, it is assumed that a party vote percentage, yik,
is available for each district i at each time k.  Special steps may be necessary
to ensure that this assumption is satisfied if one encounters splitting,
combining, birth, or death of districts or of parties.
13. For simplification we are ignoring out the issue of district heterogeneity
here.
14. In regard to earlier authors' works that have used variance-components
analysis, our main emphasis in this paper is on examining the models in
these works, rather than the formulas that the authors used to estimate the
variance components under those models. The models and the estimation
formulas are two distinct entities. In particular, one can have an inappropriate
model but appropriate estimation formulas given that that model holds, or
one could have a suitable model but improper estimation formulas. We did
examine estimation formulas as well as models, even though the former
were not a primary concern. The estimation formulas of Kawato (1987), as
described in conjunction with his equations (3)-(8), are entirely suitable
given his (questionable) model. We had difficulty in figuring out both the
model and the estimation formulas that Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale
(1984) used. Among other things, (i) no model equation is ever shown; (ii)
the only two equations in their paper, (1) and (2), are both incorrect, as is
evident from the fact that the left and right sides of the equation are not equal;
(iii) on both page 87 and page 88 the cursory verbal descriptions of their
mathematical calculations indicate that the square root was taken at the
wrong point (before rather than after division); and (iv) these descriptions
omit any mention of the essential step of performing certain subtractions
(as done, e.g., in our subtraction of MR in equations above). Stokes (1965)
gives his estimation formulas in equations (12), (13), and (14) of his Appendix.
Although (12) is a proper formula, (13) and (14) evidently have some
typographical or other errors. One would probably expect (13) and (14), like
(12), to be unbiased estimators (given his model) of the variance components
that they are intended to estimate, but they are not. Of course, Stokes'
numerical results could still be correctly calculated even though the printed
formulas, (13) and (14), are not valid.
15. Kawato applies his approach not only to (i) the vote percentages themselves
but also to (ii) the changes in vote percentages between two successive
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elections. The objection that his method ignores district effects pertains just
to (i), which is the only application that we consider here. It does not pertain
to (ii), because the district effect drops out when the difference between two
vote percentages in the same district is obtained. On the other hand, the
formulas for estimated variance components that apply to (i) are not valid for
(ii), because of the negative correlation between any two consecutive
changes in a district.
16. Just three lines of SAS code are required to trigger the formulas: A "proc
varcomp" statement with option "method = type1," a "class" statement, and
a "model" statement, the latter two specifying district and time.
17. The algebra is quite simple. With I=3 and K=2, 2
AS =3[(53-48)
2+(43-48)2] = 150;
MA=150/(2-1) = 150;
2
RS = [(59-54-53+48)
2 + (49-54-43+48)2 + (53-48-53+48)2
+ (43-48-43+48)2 + (47-42-53+48)2 + (37-42-43+48)2] = 0; and MR=
2σˆ = 0/
[(2-1)(3-1)] = 0. Thus 2ˆ Aσ = (150-0)/3 = 50. The calculations for 
2ˆ Bσ are equally
trivial.
18. In a set of papers, King and his co-authors propose alternative techniques
to deal with uncontested districts, based on estimating the expected vote for
parties that declined to participate (see especially Gelman and King 1994
and Katz and King 1999). Since these techniques are complex, apply only to
two-party systems, or may require models specific to each case, and since
our analysis covers many countries, we have not tried to use those methods.
Future case studies, however, may find these techniques useful.
19. This analysis is not a function of Northern Ireland, which is eliminated from
his analysis. Given the errors in his database, we have some concerns
about his actual figures. At the same time, however, as our table shows we
still find large degrees of heterogeneity after cleaning the data.
20. Stokes' work revealed a relatively large district variance component (our
district-time component) for Britain, though he did not emphasize that finding.
21. Using different methods (and hence definitions) Brady et al. (2000) and
others have also discussed changes in the "local effect" since the 1950s.
22. Caramani's data set is available on CD with the accompanying reference
volume. As explained in the appendix, we have had to correct a number of
errors in that database. We thank Mark Jones, Peter Siavelis, Brian Crisp,
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Maria Escobar-Lemmon, and Octavio Amorim-Neto for supplying parts of
the Latin American data. The Canadian data has two sources: the Canadian
parliamentary website (http://www.parl.gc.ca) and the official reports of the
Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. We plan to make all of these data available
on our website.
23. There was one exception to this rule: we eliminated one small Italian district
where not all parties competed. See appendix for details.
24. In some cases it was necessary to conduct the analysis on alliances rather
than parties. If the alliance was short-lived, we ran the model as if the two (or
more) parties were in alliance for our complete time series. For some
countries (such as Ireland), however, the frequent changing of parties and/
or districts was too great to overcome. Details by country are in the appendix.
25. These data are based on including all the data for the United States and the
United Kingdom. If we use just the 1955-1970 data for the United Kingdom
and just the 1950s for the United States, the correlations shrink even further
towards zero. It is important to exclude the small parties from the correlational
analysis, since small parties that compete in all districts must be relatively
homogeneous and their volatility and residual are also severely bounded.
These parties must compete in almost all districts in order to be included in
our analysis. If we exclude parties that receive less than 10 percent as
opposed to just 5 percent, the relationships weaken as well.
26. The relation between time and other components remains very weak (-0.03
and -0.01 for district heterogeneity and the district-time effect, respectively).
27. Since the statistics are based on averages it is possible to conjure up a set
of districts where the heterogeneity is zero and the district-time effect is
greater than zero, but the empirical basis for such a case seems very weak.
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